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Month: September 2018

US Releases 2017 Counter-terrorism Report Citing Effectiveness of LAF and ISF in Lebanon

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The annual country report on Lebanon published by the US State Department Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism begins with a clear statement, “Lebanon was a committed ally in the defeat-ISIS fight during 2017, and its ground forces represented one of the most effective counterterrorism partners in the region. It is worth reviewing in light of the recurring charges that Lebanon does not do enough to prevent terrorism and terrorism-related financing.

The United States provided security assistance and training to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), and worked with Lebanon’s defense and law enforcement organizations, such as the Internal Security Forces (ISF), to build its counterterrorism capabilities.” The report also notes that “Lebanon is a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, and participates in all four of the Coalition’s civilian working groups.”

The summary is in sharp contrast to critics who claim that Hezbollah has extensive influence and in fact provides direction at times to the defense and security organizations. In the details of the report, one finds that the contradictions exist because “Terrorist groups operating in Lebanon included US government-designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations Hizballah, ISIS, Hamas, and the Abdullah Azzam Brigades.”

It goes on to note that even though Lebanon continues to reaffirm its official dissociation policy, which commits it to remain out of regional conflicts, Hezbollah continues to act in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen as a proxy force for Iran. The report also points out that “Lebanon’s 12 Palestinian refugee camps, particularly the largest, Ain el-Helweh, remained outside the jurisdiction of local security forces and posed a security threat due to potential militant recruitment and terrorist infiltration.”

Thus the quandary, how does Lebanon protect its territorial integrity, independence, and multi-religious heritage when it has large, permanent forces in the country that may not share the central values that connect the Lebanese people? In fact, the report poses the problem quite starkly, “Lebanon’s confessional power-sharing system and Hizballah’s restriction of access to areas under its control hinders implementation of [Lebanon’s counterterrorism laws]. Hizballah’s political power make consensus on any anti-Hizballah legislation impossible.”

The LAF, ISF, Directorate of General Security, and General Directorate of State Security are the primary government agencies responsible for counterterrorism, and are the primary recipients of US training assistance, which focuses on building interagency cooperation and capacity-building. During 2017, the ISF was supported by a number of programs that included construction of training facilities, establishing a secure communications system, and protective gear and vehicles, which continued in 2018 along with more training in enhanced investigation techniques and digital investigative technology.

Another priority is protecting the integrity of the financial sector. Lebanon’s banks continue to cooperate with the Departments of Treasury and Justice on programs that ensure the health of the banking system. The banking community works diligently to fully implement the Hezbollah International Financing Prevention Act (HIFPA) by meeting with US government officials to review compliance, auditing, and reporting requirements defined by this act and its amendments, and distribute these regulations throughout the banking community, according to the report.

As part of its efforts to eliminate terrorist financing, Lebanon is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF); the Special Investigation Commission, which is the financial intelligence unit of the Central Bank, is a member of The Egmont Group that provides a platform for the secure exchange of expertise and financial intelligence to combat money laundering and terrorist financing (ML/TF); and Lebanon also is a member of the Counter-ISIS Finance Group (CIFG), a working group of the Defeat-ISIS Coalition.

Another area of broad bilateral cooperation are programs for Countering Violent Extremism (CVE). “Several government institutions and civil society organizations conducted CVE programs and messaging platforms. The UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon continued to work with the prime minister’s office on advancing a “National Action Plan to Prevent Violent Extremism.” The LAF developed a comprehensive counter-messaging strategy that amplifies moderate voices and uses television spots, social media, billboards, and SMS texts to counter terrorist narratives. The Lebanese cities Madjal Anjar, Saida, and Tripoli are members of the Strong Cities Network.” In addition, Saint Joseph University and Hagazian University were among global finalists in Facebook sponsored “communities against violence” competition and presented their projects in Washington, DC.

Finally, Lebanon’s regional efforts were also noted in the report. “Lebanon supported counterterrorism efforts in regional organizations and participated in counterterrorism finance programs as a member of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the Arab League, and the Union of Arab Banks. In the framework of MENAFATF and the Egmont Group, Lebanon offered training to regional peers in international standards to combat terrorist financing.” Lebanon also consistently supported UN Security Council Resolutions to combat various incidents of terrorism and partnered on security assistance initiatives with several nations, most regularly with the United Kingdom.

Given the internal and external challenges inherent in its political system and the region, Lebanon’s defense and security forces are remarkably effective in protecting the state and providing stability for the people of Lebanon. With an effective governing coalition and continued international support, the country could extend its counterterrorism operations even more broadly in the country and enable communities to focus on quality of life issues rather than security.

UNIFIL Mandate Renewed Amid Continuing Concerns and Qualified Support from Security Council

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On August 30th the UN Security Council renewed the mandate of the UN Interim Force In Lebanon (UNIFIL) for a year. UN Security Council members expressed serious concerns, according to VOANews.com,“that violations of the cease-fire agreement between Lebanon and Israel could lead to a new conflict and urged international support for Lebanon’s armed forces and their stepped up deployment in the south and at sea.”

Rodney Hunter, the USUN Mission’s political coordinator, told the UN Security Council during its meeting that twelve years after the council imposed an arms embargo “it is unacceptable that Hezbollah continues to flout this embargo, Lebanon’s sovereignty, and the will of the majority of Lebanese people.”

The centerpiece of UNIFIL’s mandate is UNSC Resolution 1701, which limits the flow of arms into the southern region of Lebanon, provides for routine meetings between the Israeli Defense Forces and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) brokered by UNIFIL (the only direct contact between Lebanon and Israel), calls for disarming the area south of the Litani River, and assists the LAF forces in providing security throughout south Lebanon.

Following a visit with UNIFIL in its Beirut office in July, we heard a different story about claims of Hezbollah’s armed infiltration in southern Lebanon from those expressed during the UN renewal. Our UNIFIL briefer said that it conducts 14,000 patrols a month with fully deployed Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) using its 10,000-person force drawn from more than 40 countries. They state that they have not found any strategic weapons or large arms caches in the geographical area of their mandate or border infractions, other than hunters with rifles and reports of shepherds in the area.

Statements that don’t distinguish between UNIFIL’s work along Israel’s border versus concerns with Hezbollah action in other parts of Lebanon can be misleading or worse, lead to a new conflict. Recognizing the potential for misunderstanding, the UN urged “all parties” to exercise “maximum calm and restraint and refrain from any action or rhetoric that could jeopardize the cessation of hostilities or destabilize the region.”

It is time for the Administration and Congress to make its own assessment in southern Lebanon. Congress and the Administration should conduct visits in the UNIFIL mandated area and fully assess actions on the ground with the objective to clarify and strengthen UNIFIL’s mandate and its support of the LAF. It must also distinguish between the actions of the UN and LAF in the south, under the UNIFIL mandate, from potential concerns in other parts of Lebanon. A clear assessment by the US, including accepting an invitation by UNIFIL to overfly suspected weapons, should be part of that assessment.

US military assistance is critical for the Lebanese Armed Forces growing role in the south in line with Resolution 1701; and efforts to undermine that bilateral relationship between the US and Lebanon only play into the hands of Russia, which has increased its pressure for a bilateral security relationship with Lebanon, something Lebanon has resisted to date.

Although not perfect, it appears that progress with the LAF and UNIFIL mandate is being made. Now is the time for the US to examine the situation with firsthand knowledge in order to advance US objectives in southern Lebanon, strengthen the LAF in its mission throughout the country and protect Lebanon’s territorial integrity from terrorism and outside interference.

UNIFIL Mandate Renewed Amid Continuing Concerns and Qualified Support from Security Council

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Edward M. Gabriel (Morocco, 1997-2001) and Jean AbiNader

On August 30th the UN Security Council renewed the mandate of the UN Interim Force In Lebanon (UNIFIL) for a year. UN Security Council members expressed serious concerns, according to VOANews.com, “that violations of the cease-fire agreement between Lebanon and Israel could lead to a new conflict and urged international support for Lebanon’s armed forces and their stepped up deployment in the south and at sea.”

Rodney Hunter, the USUN Mission’s political coordinator, told the UN Security Council during its meeting that twelve years after the council imposed an arms embargo “it is unacceptable that Hezbollah continues to flout this embargo, Lebanon’s sovereignty, and the will of the majority of Lebanese people.”

The centerpiece of UNIFIL’s mandate is UNSC Resolution 1701, which limits the flow of arms into the southern region of Lebanon, provides for routine meetings between the Israeli Defense Forces and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) brokered by UNIFIL (the only direct contact between Lebanon and Israel), calls for disarming the area south of the Litani River, and assists the LAF forces in providing security throughout south Lebanon.

Following a visit with UNIFIL in its Beirut office in July, we heard a different story about claims of Hezbollah’s armed infiltration in southern Lebanon from those expressed during the UN renewal. Our UNIFIL briefer said that it conducts 14,000 patrols a month with fully deployed Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) using its 10,000-person force drawn from more than 40 countries. They state that they have not found any strategic weapons or large arms caches in the geographical area of their mandate or border infractions, other than hunters with rifles and reports of shepherds in the area.

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Statements that don’t distinguish between UNIFIL’s work along Israel’s border versus concerns with Hezbollah action in other parts of Lebanon can be misleading or worse, lead to a new conflict.  Recognizing the potential for misunderstanding, the UN urged “all parties” to exercise “maximum calm and restraint and refrain from any action or rhetoric that could jeopardize the cessation of hostilities or destabilize the region.”

It is time for the Administration and Congress to make its own assessment in southern Lebanon. Congress and the Administration should conduct visits in the UNIFIL mandated area and fully assess actions on the ground with the objective to clarify and strengthen UNIFIL’s mandate and its support of the LAF.  It must also distinguish between the actions of the UN and LAF in the south, under the UNIFIL mandate, from potential concerns in other parts of Lebanon. A clear assessment by the US, including accepting an invitation by UNIFIL to overfly suspected weapons, should be part of that assessment.

US military assistance is critical for the Lebanese Armed Forces growing role in the south in line with Resolution 1701; and efforts to undermine that bilateral relationship between the US and Lebanon only play into the hands of Russia, which has increased its pressure for a bilateral security relationship with Lebanon, something Lebanon has resisted to date.

Although not perfect, it appears that progress with the LAF and UNIFIL mandate is being made. Now is the time for the US to examine the situation with firsthand knowledge in order to advance US objectives in southern Lebanon, strengthen the LAF in its mission throughout the country and protect Lebanon’s territorial integrity from terrorism and outside interference.

Edward M. Gabriel is the former U.S. Ambassador to Morocco, currently President of the American Task Force for Lebanon (ATFL) and a member of the Council of American Ambassadors. Jean AbiNader is a senior adviser to ATFL.

Calls for US Syria Strategy Increase as Push on Idlib Promises Civilian Bloodbath

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The siege of Idlib has focused the world once again on the humanitarian and moral tragedy of Syria, this time in response to the likely high cost of rooting out the remaining extremist militias in the north. The proposal of the Astana partners – Russia, Turkey, and Iran along with Syria – to lock in a compromise alternative that will lessen the civilian casualty toll, limit the number of new refugees fleeing into Turkey, and protect the Assad regime from increased international sanctions is marginally credible.

In an article published in Defense One, Representative Adam Kinzinger (Rep. IL), an Air Force veteran of Iraq and Afghanistan, noted in exasperation that “We [the US government] cannot turn a blind eye and ignore the horrific reality in Syria right now. We cannot isolate ourselves from this crisis.” Contained by Syrian forces and their allies, the people of Idlib, including Syrian refugees from other areas of the country, are certain to sustain high numbers of casualties in the coming weeks as the Salafi-jihadi militants are literally holding the civilians hostage in what is considered their last stronghold.

Kinzinger, well aware of the quagmire that Syria poses, is not asking for more US troops but rather that the US develop a coherent game plan for the longer term and then decide what resources are needed. “We need a long-term strategy in Syria that leads to a solution of peace and an end to the ongoing, deadly conflict. This strategy should also include the end of the Assad regime and a place at the table of government for the Syrian people.”

The Congressman has already mounted an effort to convince the Administration of the need for a coherent strategy. “In July, I sent a letter, with support from my colleagues in Congress, urging the White House to develop an official strategy for the US to maintain a strong presence in Syria, implement no-fly zones along the southern and eastern Syrian borders, and ultimately position the United States as the global leader our world needs right now.”

He is concerned that the lack of a credible US policy in Syria indicates to other countries that the US has abandoned the high ground in providing hope to the people of Syria and elsewhere. For him, Syria is the opportunity to rebuild trust in America’s role, “We are still that shining city on a hill, and a beacon of hope for peace and prosperity.” To achieve that, Kinzinger believes that the US must confront Iran and Russia, call down the Assad regime for its excesses, and “speak out for the freedom-loving people who so desperately need America’s voice. Let’s shine our light on the oppressive darkness around the world. And let’s save Syria.”

In a policy brief released by the Brookings Institute, five well known analysts argue for a slight shift in US policy that will ”prevent the re-emergence of ISIS or a related extremist group, limit Iranian influence in Syria, and address humanitarian and refugee stresses in the region that severely affect U.S. allies….” Their prescription includes working with Syria’s allies and other critical players to develop a political succession process to move away from the Assad regime before any serious reconstruction efforts begin with the assistance of international donors; threatening credible aerial retaliation against excessive actions by the Assad regime including chemical weapons and barrel bombs on civilian targets, with a similar warning to Iran should it use its proxies to threaten the US or its allies; providing localized humanitarian and reconstruction efforts in the areas under US influence without an increase in US forces; and working with Turkey to “weaken” extremists around Idlib and continue to fight against “ISIS elements in the country’s east until the battlefield defeat of ISIS is complete.”

The analysis, which is detailed and useful as a basis of discussion, examines the current situation on the ground including the various military forces and their zones of influence, noting, “As Assad consolidates his authority, his regime continues to rule with methods that drove the creation of ISIS in the first place, making further Sunni extremism a likely consequence of his empowered regime.” It also points out that the US needs a robust policy that counters Iran’s expanding influence in the region and it provides insights into Turkey’s stake in resolving the conflict so that its interests in reducing refugee flows, repatriation and reconstruction, and limiting the independence aspirations of the Kurds are recognized and included in resolution options.

Perhaps the most important question concerning a US Syria strategy in the medium to long-term has to deal with the consistency and sustainability of a policy enunciated by one administration and then challenged by its successor. The recommendations in the report will take years to unfold across the many issues raised in its analysis, bringing up the challenge of developing a policy that has credibility over time.

Relevant questions regarding reconstruction are broached in an article on the Carnegie Institute’s site Diwan, which pointedly suggests that “Reconstruction in places such as Syria is especially complicated by the questions of how assistance can be given to a regime that was in large part responsible for the country’s devastation and has been implicated in war crimes. International actors today are struggling with whether and how to support reconstruction for Syrian communities while ensuring that this does not end up privileging political supporters of the regime. Standing aside from reconstruction efforts may avoid offering support to the Assad regime, but at the cost of perpetuating Syrian suffering and ceding postwar influence to other actors.”

Given the vastly complicated and intermixed issues regarding Syria’s immediate future, there is a clear need for US policies that are realistic; seek political transition and transitional justice; define and protect US interests in the medium and long term; support repatriation and reconstruction efforts that are comprehensive, inclusive, and community-based; and reestablish trust among the US and its partners in the region. A tall order for an administration dealing with threats of nuclear war, trade war, and diminishing credibility as a global leader.

Business Notes: Lebanon’s Economy Not on Life Support, Yet; Preparations on for Second Round of Ener

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There are mixed assessments of Lebanon’s economy ranging from desperation to optimism, and depending on one’s choice of indicators, any judgement can be justified. The only real consensus seems to be that the Central Bank (BDL) is the glue that holds Lebanon’s economy together, so when Riad Salame, the Governor speaks, it’s smart to pay attention.

In a recent CNBC interview, he challenged reports that Lebanon’s economy has been greatly weakened by a shrinking GDP fed by lower rates of tourism, remittances, and investment, the lack of a government, and the continued impact of border closures and Syrian refugees. However, Salame acknowledged that “faster progress in political reconciliation and economic transparency as crucial to meeting the country’s desperate need for better infrastructure, investment, and private sector job creation.”

He specifically mentioned that Lebanon needs to implement the reforms pledged at the CEDRE conference in Paris in April at which international donors pledged $11 billion in grants and loans largely on the basis of conditions related to accountability and transparency. Salame said that “The economy needs fresh infrastructure to create growth and jobs. People are hopeful that this will be coming if there is a government.” At 152%, Lebanon has the third largest ratio of public debt to gross domestic product (GDP) in the world. The International Monetary Fund has warned that Lebanon needs “an immediate and substantial fiscal adjustment” to make its public debt sustainable.

Despite warnings from the IMF and others, public debt continues to grow. Until now, the BDL has kept the government afloat by selling high interest short-term bonds to local banks, a policy now in jeopardy due to the economic slowdown. The Economist Intelligence Unit was straightforward in its evaluation. “With sluggish growth, predicted at 2 percent for the year, rising global interest rates, and an influx of more than a million Syrian refugees overwhelming the country’s outdated infrastructure, many fear crisis on the horizon. Political and security concerns stemming from the Syrian war and turmoil between Saudi Arabia and Iran — whose rivalry often sees tiny Lebanon caught in the crossfire — have knocked tourism, real estate, and foreign investment to their lowest levels in years.”

Although the BDL has more than $44 billion in assets, not including gold, which covers more than two years of imports, given the low growth rate, its policy of offering high returns on short-term loans is no longer sustainable. As Salame concluded, “The political situation, the security situation, this is a region where you have political issues and wars going on. We don’t know where this will end up.”

Energy is a sector that many see as Lebanon’s financial savior, yet even its development is not as straightforward as it should be. From threats emanating from Israel’s interests in exploiting nearby blocs, to the need for laws spelling out legal guidance for concessions and a sovereign wealth fund to manage revenues, much needs to be done in advance of the second round of bidding scheduled for the end of 2018.

Just this past week, Speaker Nabih Berri voiced concern that Total, the French oil and gas firm that is the lead company on the first award, announced its intention to postpone exploration in Block 9, which borders Israel’s maritime zone and contains waters claimed by both sides. “Total was supposed to start operation in 2019 but has postponed it till the spring of 2020,” said Lebanon 24, a local news agency.

A recent article on Executive Magazine.com highlighted the challenges. “Over the past few years, there has been a tendency toward big announcements over adopting a more pragmatic and prudent approach. This included premature announcements of the launch of the first licensing round—despite an incomplete framework—and of key milestones afterwards. The key takeaway from the first licensing round—from the local perspective and the handling of the tender—is that there is an order for things. Hopefully, both the legal and institutional framework will be complete and fully functional by the time Lebanon officially launches its second offshore licensing round. Stability and the ability to anticipate the regulatory framework are vital for investors in the sector, and are the first key to the success of a licensing round.”

So often, media coverage of the energy sector tend to make it seem that the bonanza awaits, when it is only this last month that “The Lebanese government approved a number of laws to ensure proper management and transparency of the oil and gas sector including the right to access to information law and petroleum tax law. More laws are needed to promote confidence in the Lebanese petroleum investment climate and ensure transparency toward the public.”

Maybe the reason the recent bills passed was, as Energy and Water Minister Cesar Abi Khalil said, they are largely guidelines, not legally binding but as indicators of what interested parties might anticipate when binding legislation is finalized. The importance of this step is useful in that, as Minister Abi Khalil said, “It combines everything in one law, with a clear text.” In addition, a parliamentary subcommittee is studying draft legislation to establish a sovereign wealth fund for proceeds from oil and gas exploration.

While politicians differ on how to carve up Lebanon’s economic and political resources, there should at least be a consensus on how to create value as opportunities arise. But as the lack of official movement on CEDRE reforms, government formation, and consolidation of needed energy sector legislation indicate, it is still too often played as a zero-sum game.

News Notes: Druze Community Under Pressure; External Actors’ Rivalry Portends No Win for Lebanon; Sy

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While government formation continues to sputter, calling up any number of conspiracy theories, PM Saad Hariri has given it his best shot, submitting a draft ministerial team makeup to President Michel Aoun this week. It has been reported that infighting among Christians and Druze is the core disagreement over the government’s composition. In the meantime, Lebanon faces yet another challenge in recalibrating its work with UNWRA after the withdrawal of US foreign assistance to Palestinian refugees, replaced by contributions from several Gulf countries. Although UNWRA schools started as scheduled, there is still a great deal to be done if the financing transition is to take place without further harm to Palestinians in camps and elsewhere.

As mentioned earlier this year, the Druze and the Future Movement of PM Hariri were most undone by the new electoral law, which diminished the Parliamentary presence of both. However, since the Taif agreement allocated all sects a share of power, the Druze retained their “right” to three government ministries, and the Druze community is at odds as to how to internally divide their share. This is literally the least of their problems. The new nation-state law in Israel has drawn fierce opposition from Israeli Druze who serve in the country’s military and until recently had full rights of citizenship.

In Syria, tens of thousands of Druze have been displaced and their once formidable political-military role has been diminished as the result of a joint Russian-Syrian effort to reshape the country. Mona Alami, in a recent post in the Fikra Forum provides a disheartening tally of the forces eroding the once-important influence of Druze in the region.

She wrote that, “The current state of affairs for Druze across the Levant is a clear break with the community’s recent past, where communities benefited from relatively significant political influence and autonomy.” In Syria, the Russians made it clear that the local Druze militias must disarm and over 54,000 young Druze must report for military duty. “These actions left the communities by and large defenseless to the attack as well as future attacks in the area.”

Alami concludes, “By refusing to revise traditions that hinder the survival of Druze identity, allowing inner divisions to supersede long-term interests, and failing to strengthen cross-regional ties, the Druze appear doomed to follow the path of continuous decline. With its leaders losing the influence that has so far protected the community, the Druze must take seriously the threat of disappearing altogether.”

With the Syria civil war contained to a few small pockets, what is Iran’s price tag for protecting the Assad regime? In an insightful piece written for the Independent, long time Middle East observer based in Beirut, Robert Fiske, noted the spiral of competing interests and maneuvers that are going on as the Syrian civil war winds down. He points to statements from Russian, Syrian, and other sources that claim that Lebanon cannot have normalcy without returning to Syria’s embrace, but Iran has a stake in Lebanon as a function of its support for Hezbollah on the northern flank of Israel.

His article concludes: “So if Lebanon needs Syria more than Syria needs Lebanon, I suppose that Lebanon needs America more than America needs Lebanon – but Iran needs Lebanon more than Lebanon needs Iran. And the Saudis need Lebanon, because they can use Hariri as the figurehead of Sunnism against the Shia Hezbollah/Syrian axis and thus damage Shia Iran.” Lebanon, given its enormous public debt, hopeful that highways to its Gulf markets will reopen, and also wanting to be part of the Syrian reconstruction effort, is not an independent actor. Fiske believes that the clear winner is the Russians, who, at little cost, have asserted their primacy in the region.

In an article calling for a more robust and consistent US strategy in post-civil war Syria, Frederic Hof argues that the Trump Administration, while an improvement over the Obama Administration’s lack of clarity and action, requires a well-reasoned and determined agenda. He writes, “This administration should decide what it wants of Syria and build a strategy to get it.” Hof goes on, “The view here is that the United States must sustain the long-term objective of full political transition within a united Syria independent of Iran.” Rather than rely on boots on the ground, he believes that, “A workable strategy would instead center on two things: permitting an alternative to the pro-Iranian Assad to grow in a protected northeastern Syria liberated from ISIS; and protecting Syrian civilians from Assad regime mass murder inflicted by chemicals and other instruments of state terror.”

Hof welcomes US opposition to Iran’s destabilizing role in the region, noting that, “This administration has drawn a line on Iran’s destabilization of the Middle East. Even as it opposes Islamist extremism of the Sunni variety—ISIS and al-Qaeda—it recognizes that the Shia variety—Iran and Hezbollah, supported by Assad—is just as destructive and has enjoyed far more success than its Sunni counterparts: there is, after all, overt state sponsorship and support.”

Trying to parse Russia’s strategy, Carl Bildt, a former prime minister of Sweden, wrote in The Strategist that we should not be misled by Russia’s sudden interest in the repatriation of Syrian refugees. It is a tactic, being broadcast far and wide, to attract funding for Syrian reconstruction without Syria footing the bill. “With the US stepping back,” he notes, “it is obvious why Putin suddenly wants to talk to the Europeans about the plight of Syrian refugees. He didn’t care about them when his bombs were falling on their neighborhoods and forcing them to flee. But now that he wants Europe to bail out Assad, he has found some compassion.”

Bildt further writes that, “No other country in the past half-century has suffered so heavy a toll in human lives and physical destruction. There can be no doubt that the responsibility for this tragedy rests with the Assad regime and its Russian and Iranian sponsors. It is clear from Putin’s European charm offensive that Russia has no intention of footing even a small part of the bill. Apparently, the Kremlin does not feel as though it has a duty to rebuild the cities and restore the livelihoods that its bombs destroyed.”

Ironically, Assad has made it clear that European companies are not welcome to support the reconstruction effort and that Russian firms will be first in line, although he doesn’t make clear how Russia will finance projects it can’t even deliver at home. As Bildt comments, “The last thing that Europeans should do is send money directly to Assad. A far better option is to offer direct financial support to individuals and families that are willing and able to return to their country.”

Without a viable political solution, adopted by the international community, that sees a transition in power to a more inclusive regime, he believes that Europe must insist on a “genuine political solution… After the destruction that the Assad regime has wrought, there is no other way forward.