Lebanon Daily News Brief 10/30/20

DAILY NEWS


Hundreds Protest French Anti-Islam Cartoon
The Daily Star

Government to be Formed ‘Sunday or Monday’ as ‘Druze Hurdle’ Lingers
Naharnet

Lebanon Justice Minister ‘Waiting’ to Judge Blast Probe
Timour Azhari
Al Jazeera

Deal on Horizon After Lebanon Maritime Border Talks
Najia Houssari
Arab News

OPINION & ANALYSIS


Lebanon and Algeria: Lessons From The Uprisings
Jean AbiNader

Lebanon a Year Later: Economic Collapse, Riots, Pandemic and Beirut Explosion
Interview with Ruth Sherlock
NPR

To Realize Its Interests, Lebanon Must Navigate Away From Confrontation with Israel
Hassan Mneimneh
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in these articles are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the American Task Force on Lebanon, a non-profit, nonpartisan leadership organization of Lebanese-Americans.

Lebanon and Algeria: Lessons from the Uprisings

The rise of popular movements across the Maghreb and in Lebanon in the past decade is no coincidence. Aside from the shared experience of French colonialism, these countries also share many social, economic, and political characteristics, making for an interesting comparison of these movements across the region. Tunisia is moving towards greater democracy on the basis of negotiations among key players in civil society, while political elites dig in their heels hoping to maintain their preferential economic benefits; and the army is not a key player in the governing formula. Morocco, by contrast, has a king and long tradition of a royal culture that is sustained by deferential behavior from its people as it moves slowly towards broader citizen empowerment.

It is Algeria’s hirak or “movement” where there are the greatest similarities to what has been happening over the past year to Lebanon’s thawra or “revolution.” Both are popular uprisings challenging the vested interests that dominate the country, abet corruption, and drain the country’s economy. They both brought about leadership change; avoided clashes with the military; and crossed sectarian, demographic, and regional identities. They both have also diminished in strength and sustainability due to similar reasons: incremental, largely cosmetic leadership changes which diverted some supporters; the impact of the pandemic; maneuvering by traditional elites to maintain their prerogatives; and eroding commonality of interests, priorities, and tactics.

A deeper analysis may yield some lessons learned as much as how well-intentioned and determined opposition movements were unable to develop momentum to bring about systematic reforms and inclusive societal change.

Algeria’s Hirak
There is a recent opinion piece by Abed Charef in Middle East Eye offering his perspective on the current status of the hirak. He begins with the statement that “the Hirak as a political movement is a thing of the past. The time has come to look at what we have learned and to make adjustments for the country’s new political landscape, a situation requiring the examination of possible new perspectives and means of political action.”

Charef begins by contrasting the hirak to the previous Front de Libération National (FLN) merging from a revolutionary nationalist movement to a status quo political entity that lacked democratic values. He notes that “The Hirak movement is an altogether different beast, born of a mindset and an objective, and lacking any organizational model whatsoever.”

“Beginning on February 22, 2019, in response to the attempt by incumbent president Bouteflika to endow himself with a fifth term, millions of Algerians took to the streets, rising up against the humiliation of a fifth Bouteflika mandate – against the corruption, mismanagement, and injustice of the Algerian political system. It was a broad indictment; a rejection of both the ruling elite and the ham-fisted opposition.”

He goes on, “The Algerian people were marching for recognition, for dignity and freedom, for the right to voice their feelings and to realize their goals. For the first time since independence, the people had taken to the streets. Millions of Algerians of all walks of life, of all generations and persuasions, marched together to say: ‘Enough is enough!’”

The parallels to the October 19, 2019, uprising in Lebanon cannot be overlooked. Upset by the continued mismanagement of the country and its resources, and rebelling against yet another act of intimidation and erosion of their quality of life, millions of Lebanese across sectarian, generational, and geographic lines took to the streets demanding the end of the current government and its culture of cronyism, corruption, despoiling of the environment, and abuse of the financial system. They called for an overhaul of the country’s leadership saying kellon ya’neh kellon: “All of you means all of you.”

In Algeria, the army swiftly reasserted its role as the ultimate arbiter of political power, replacing Bouteflika; bringing corruption charges against many of his cronies and senior officials from the army, security services, and the government; and setting new dates for presidential elections. But a revolution was not in the cards. The hirak was unable to develop a coherent opposition or a political program based on concrete, well-reasoned and implementable policies, and in the end the army stood alone at the top of the power pyramid. To have a credible plan, Charef says ruefully, “This requires reflection, consultation, negotiation and compromise – qualities sadly lacking in Algerian political life.”

Lebanon’s Thawra
The demonstrators in Lebanon initially had a great rush of adrenalin from the vitality of being a national movement that brought hope to their dreams and dread to the oligarchy that controls the country. As Anthony Elghossain writes in the Middle East Institute’s special briefing on Lebanon a year after the uprising, “They attacked Lebanese leaders, learning the hard way that some are more sacred than others — and that sacredness tends to correspond proportionally to the power of any such leader’s partisans. They climbed out of oblivion — reminding their leaders that they existed and statespersons that stability and peace aren’t the same damn thing.”

Joseph Bahout uses the expression of “a mafia and a militia” to describe Lebanon’s union between elites and Hezbollah that bided its time before confronting the demonstrators. According to Elghossain, by the end of 2019, many demonstrators who had mobilized in a common statement of protest had returned to their routines and “left the streets to people who’ve dominated dissent over the past decade: reformists and revolutionaries, including serial activists, dedicated civil society organizers, academics, young professionals, and/or some of Lebanon’s youth.”

With the demonstrations weakened by the weather, the pandemic, and the increasingly precarious erosion of their standard of living, there were few who would claim progress despite the momentary disruption to the old political leadership. “Reformists and revolutionaries have not realized their demands. They’ve not achieved their envisioned change, inspired citizens to join them, or influenced practical politics. And they’ve not — not actually, not adequately — identified, assessed, and exploited opportunities to integrate immediate action into broad-based, long-range campaigns for political power, institutional leverage, and sociocultural influence.”

Yet, as in Algeria, the low level agitation and organizing continues. Civil society and the rapidly dwindling middle class better understand the challenges ahead and there is a growing understanding on what must be done to be better organized and empowered to upset the status quo. “And, regardless of their hopes, ambitions, and disappointments, some of them are doing what is necessary today so that others can do what is sufficient tomorrow.”

A casualty of the reduced energy of the demonstrations in both countries is that many Algerians and Lebanese are headed elsewhere to find a sustainable quality of life. As Elghossain observes that is apropos for both countries, “The Lebanese who desire change must learn from the leaders they’re struggling against. They must operate in the spaces between, understanding that their success is neither inevitable nor impossible. Becoming comfortable with uncertainty, compromise, piecemeal progress, and imperfect practice of politics, they must now do what they would have needed to do had they succeeded, anyway: reimagine their campaign for change as a long-range, ever-evolving initiative, through which they may work to forge the future they desire without losing themselves.”

Both Algeria and Lebanon are facing the inevitable decline that sets in when the social contract is no longer operable, relevant, or credible. The bankruptcy of the spirit is more damaging long term than the financial catastrophe in Lebanon or the lack of economic mobility in Algeria. But neither the protestors and civil society nor the government apparatus can do it without significant recalibration of the state’s role in the lives of its citizens.

The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the American Task Force on Lebanon.

Lebanon Daily News Brief 10/29/20

DAILY NEWS


In Beirut Port, All of Lebanon’s Ills Are Laid Bare
Samia Nakhoul, Ellen Francis, Michael Georgy
Reuters

Draft Proposal of a 20-Minister Cabinet Emerges
Naharnet

Rights Groups Slam Lebanon’s Block of New Worker Contract
Arab News

Lebanon, Israel in New Day of Maritime Border Talks
Naharnet

OPINION & ANALYSIS


The Return of Hariri – Tragedy, Farce, or the Only Hope?
Benjamin MacShane
The Globalist

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in these articles are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the American Task Force on Lebanon, a non-profit, nonpartisan leadership organization of Lebanese-Americans.

Lebanon Daily News Brief 10/28/20

DAILY NEWS


Israel Says Second Round of Sea Border Talks with Lebanon Under Way
Reuters

Lebanon to Adopt ‘Game Changer’ Stance in Maritime Border Negotiations with Israel
Nick Newsom
The Daily Star

Aoun Discusses with Lavrentiev the Russian Initiative on Refugees
Naharnet

US Election 2020: Little Faith in Trump or Biden, Suggests Arab Poll
Frank Gardner
BBC News

OPINION & ANALYSIS


Washington and Beirut: The US-Lebanon Military Relationship
Joseph Haboush
Middle East Institute

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in these articles are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the American Task Force on Lebanon, a non-profit, nonpartisan leadership organization of Lebanese-Americans.

Lebanon Daily News Brief 10/27/20

DAILY NEWS


Israel, Lebanon to Start Maritime Border Talks
Dale Gavlak
Voice of America

Pound Drops as Lebanon Awaits New Cabinet
The Daily Star

Government of ‘Specialists’ to be Named by Parties Amid ‘Positive’ Atmosphere
Naharnet

OPINION & ANALYSIS


Special Briefing: Lebanon One Year on From the October Uprising
Middle East Institute

Pan-Arab Poll: Biden Better for Region, But Must Shun Obama Policies
Arab News

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in these articles are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the American Task Force on Lebanon, a non-profit, nonpartisan leadership organization of Lebanese-Americans.

Lebanon Daily News Brief 10/26/20

DAILY NEWS


Lebanon’s Parliamentary Blocs to Help Hariri Form New Government
Najia Houssari
Arab News

Russian Delegation to Arrive Wednesday in Beirut
Naharnet

On the Anniversary of the Marine Barracks Terrorist Attack
Secretary Mike Pompeo
US State Department

US Welcomes Countries’ Action Against Hezbollah
Secretary Mike Pompeo
US State Department

Estonia

Guatemala

OPINION & ANALYSIS


Why Lebanon Needs Its Revolution
Neville Teller
Eurasia Review

 

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in these articles are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the American Task Force on Lebanon, a non-profit, nonpartisan leadership organization of Lebanese-Americans.

This Week in Lebanon

OCTOBER 25, 2020
Saad Hariri Renamed Lebanon’s Prime Minister
Human Rights Group Says Lebanon’s Blast Probe Not Credible
US House Representatives Urge Humanitarian Aid

 

Saad Hariri Renamed Lebanon’s Prime Minister
One year after Saad Hariri resigned from his role as Prime Minister, he has been reinstated as PM once again with a slim majority of votes from parliament. Political groups that voted in favor of Hariri’s return include his own Future Movement, the Shia Amal Movement, the Druze Progressive Socialist Party and the Syrian Socialist Nationalist party. The Free Patriotic Movement and Lebanese Forces abstained and Hezbollah did not vote for Hariri either. Tasked with forming his fourth government, Hariri promised to form a government of non-partisan experts and to reconstruct Beirut’s damage left from the August 4 explosion. (Al Jazeera)

ANALYSIS

“The hope now is that the incoming PM Saad Hariri can form an independent, reform minded government. The IMF and international donors are clear: an independently empowered government must quickly put forward and begin implementing a “comprehensive” plan of reforms, including financial, economic, political, and social programs, and Lebanon’s parliament must be willing to fast track legislation to support such a plan. Nothing short of this will succeed. Once again, it’s in the hands of the country’s rulers to do what they have failed to do for the past year. UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon Jan Kubis said Thursday, shortly after ex-PM Saad Hariri was named to form a new government, ‘Do not count on miracles, foreign elections or external donors – the rescue must start in Lebanon, by Lebanon.'”
-ATFL President Edward M. Gabriel


Human Rights Group Says Lebanon’s Blast Probe Not Credible
This week Human Rights Watch reported that the Lebanon-led investigation into the Beirut blasts in August has been distorted by political meddling and a lack of judicial independence. The group has called for the United Nations to lead an inquiry into the cause of the explosion. HRW called on international supporters, led by France, to press the Lebanese authorities to accept an independent inquiry. (Associated Press)

ANALYSIS

“It is not enough that the blast occurred but the subsequent investigations have been hamstrung by the oligarchy’s unwillingness to accept responsibility further than acknowledging that it happened on their watch. How long with the Lebanese people remain at the mercy of leaders who avoid leadership and how will they once again trust their justice system when it is manipulated with ease? Time for a transparent international investigation to restore some integrity to the discovery process.”
-ATFL Policy Director Jean AbiNader


US House Representatives Urge Humanitarian Aid
US House Representatives are urging the Trump administration to ensure continued assistance to the Lebanese people following the Beirut explosion. Representatives Guy Reschenthaler (R-PA) and Elaine Luria (D-VA) led a bipartisan letter sent to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo asking for more oversight and action to help Lebanon and ensure that the funds aren’t being misused by Hezbollah. The letter says that Hezbollah exploited $18 million in humanitarian aid sent after the blast. (The Hill)

ANALYSIS

“The bipartisan letter continues a theme of previous appeals from Congress to the Administration: support the Lebanese people and avoid any diversion of this aid to Hezbollah-linked entities. This challenges donors since Hezbollah is entwined with many organizations and agencies. Yet hesitating to provide badly needed humanitarian assistance damages the credibility of the international community. Fortunately, there are many credible international and local NGOs on the ground that can direct resources where the needs are greatest, among the Lebanese and the refugees in the country.”
-ATFL Policy Director Jean AbiNader

Click here for ATFL approved NGOs to donate to.


Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the American Task Force on Lebanon, a non-profit, nonpartisan leadership organization of Lebanese-Americans.

Lebanon Daily News Brief 10/23/20

DAILY NEWS


United States Sanctions Two Hezbollah Officials
Secretary Mike Pompeo Press Statement
US State Department

House Lawmakers Call for Continued Assistance to Lebanon
Juliegrace Brufke
The Hill

Hariri Meets Bassil, Parliamentary Blocs for Cabinet Consultations
The Daily Star

OPINION & ANALYSIS


Trump vs. Biden on Middle East Policy – Round 1
Jean AbiNader

 

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in these articles are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the American Task Force on Lebanon, a non-profit, nonpartisan leadership organization of Lebanese-Americans.

Trump vs Biden on Middle East Policy – Round 1

There has been a great deal of speculation about how a Biden presidency might differ from the Trump administration in its foreign relations. The range of opinions reflects the authors’ varying perspectives about US foreign policy and America’s place in the world. In some cases there is praise for Trump’s positions while damning his style; in others, the critiques on both sides can reflect a sometimes harsh divergence in beliefs about what is in America’s best interests.

So to help muddle the conversation further, here are some recent analyses.

According to an article from the Quincy Institute, a relatively new player in the think tank community in Washington, DC, “Despite Trump’s instinct for American grievances, the majority of his policies in the Middle East have perpetuated a pattern of US policy toward the region that exacerbates insecurity and human misery.” It commends the administration for its willingness to “embrace audacity” in shaping policy, and its interest in reconsidering relationships in the region to focus on what best serves US interests. The article calls for ending support for the war in Yemen, restarting diplomacy with Iran, and pursuing diplomatic rather than military solutions.

These recommendations all mirror positions in the Biden position papers. The Quincy Institute policy paper, “A new US paradigm for the Middle East – ending America’s misguided policy of domination,” mentions eight steps the new administration should adopt. These include a reduction of US forces from the Gulf “because a large military presence isn’t needed to prevent a hostile regional hegemon” – a stance that is squarely in opposition to the current administration’s policy. It also calls for a new security architecture so that the US can “remove itself as the main security power in the region.” This would go hand in hand with “a deliberative drawdown regardless of stability milestones” that might prolong our presence unnecessarily.

For Biden, diplomacy would once again be the starting point for engagement, including with Iran; avoid making Iraq a battlefield with Iran; and exercise diplomacy in efforts to end the wars in Syria and Yemen. As the former VP has mentioned, the US would reduce its support for allies in the region that encourages aggressive rather than diplomatic behaviors. And finally, on a theme near and dear to Biden, the US would once again be the exemplar of human rights and rule of law at home and abroad.

An interesting challenge for the prospective Biden administration is that, as Trump demonstrated so well in 2016, it is easier to run against the previous administration’s efforts than lead with positions that might be subject to criticism. However, the former VP was a key player in the Obama administration, so he either has to defend past policies or indicate what he has learned in the intervening years. This is well illustrated, for example, by how he might respond to the many changes that have occurred in the MENA region in the past four years. One key issue is the competition among world and regional powers for influence. The US has to decide to what degree its security interests are served by a robust hard power role in that regard.

In arguing against the concern that a reduced US presence in the region will give Russia and China opportunities, a National Interest blog claims that “It is more sensible to welcome rivals’ inheriting the instability, struggles, and grievances that the US has found so vexing than to guard against it… Any power who decided to replace the role vacated by the US will find itself in at least as much of a quagmire – only with far less resources to manage it.”

In a direct reference to the Biden campaign, it says, “The United States can strengthen its position less with bases and permanent alliances and more with the sober diplomatic behavior of a trustworthy yet distant maintainer of a balance between powerful nations.”

This is hardly the view of the President’s supporters. They believe that international alliances, the global economy, and promoting democracy and human rights has not secured stability or prosperity for the US so why continue with policies that do not serve our vital interests?

Regarding who are our friends and who are not, Trump has so far favored supporting leaders who reflect his disdain for democratic checks and balances on executive decision-making, such as Turkey’s Erdogan, Egypt’s Sisi, as well as MBS and MBZ in the Gulf. His penchant for transactional diplomacy is well illustrated by his treatment of the Kurds, Iraqis, the Syrian opposition, Turks, Iranians, and others; often defining diplomacy as a zero-sum competition.

Does this mean a Trump foreign policy in the MENA is without merit? Not if you are a supporter of Israel’s security, a hard line on Iran’s dysfunctional role in the region and beyond, pro-arms sales as a tie that binds us to our friends, and ending what seem to be “endless wars” that make no sense to many American voters.

A second Trump administration would further refrain from direct action in places like Yemen, Libya, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and Egypt, again focusing on “what’s the benefit” as the guiding principle. For weak states like those in North Africa and Lebanon, it will continue to be a tug-of-war within the State Department as to how best to support the US interests in any bilateral relationship.

This brings up the concern expressed by Biden supporters for the need to reinvigorate the State Department by generating a new improved vision of American policy abroad, removing Trump loyalists who decimated career personnel and created loyalty litmus tests, and re-empowering diplomats whose opinions and experience were devalued by the Trump administration.

The next part of this blog will focus on country-specific differences and examine the question of whether or not there are enduring US interests in the MENA region.

 

The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the American Task Force on Lebanon.

Lebanon Daily News Brief 10/22/20

DAILY NEWS


Saad Hariri Renamed as Lebanon PM a Year After Stepping Down
Timour Azhari
Al Jazeera

Watchdog Says Lebanon Probe into Port Blast Flawed
Associated Press

US House Representatives Urge Immediate Humanitarian Aid to Lebanon
US Congress

OPINION & ANALYSIS


The Tragedy of Doing Nothing
Amer Bisat
Carnegie Middle East Center

Lebanon-Israel Maritime Talks Need Not Start in a Vacuum
Frederic Hof
Financial Times

 

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in these articles are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the American Task Force on Lebanon, a non-profit, nonpartisan leadership organization of Lebanese-Americans.