Month: July 2022

Ambassador Collard writes, “In my meetings with politicians and bankers, most seem not to want to accept that Lebanon must do everything that is asked in order to receive an international rescue package. There can be no Lebanon exceptionalism any more. Lebanon must adopt the necessary laws, open the books without preconditions, and reset the banking sector. The alternative is more and more of you forced into increasingly desperate measures to survive. Reform, done now, is the key to resolving Lebanon’s economic woes. Now is not the time for politicking. Never has it been more critical for your leaders to take the necessary decisions, however challenging that may be. They owe it to you to deliver better governance, transparency and accountability. They must show compassion and a commitment to bettering the lives of their fellow country people. Public interest must outweigh personal interest.” 

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Williams, Habershon, and Dale write, “Arabs are losing faith in democracy to deliver economic stability across the Middle East and North Africa, according to a major new survey. Nearly 23,000 people were interviewed across nine countries and the Palestinian territories for BBC News Arabic by the Arab Barometer network. Most agreed with the statement that an economy is weak under a democracy. The findings come just over a decade after the so-called Arab Spring protests called for democratic change. Less than two years after the protests, just one of those countries – Tunisia – remained a democracy, but a draft constitution published last week could push the country back towards authoritarianism, if approved. Michael Robbins, director of Arab Barometer, a research network based at Princeton University which worked with universities and polling organisations in the Middle East and North Africa to conduct the survey between late 2021 and Spring 2022, says there has been a regional shift in views on democracy since the last survey in 2018/19.”

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Al-Mughrabi and Rasheed write, “Eid al-Adha, one of Islam’s two main festivals, marks the climax of the annual haj pilgrimage, when Muslims slaughter animals to commemorate the willingness of Ibrahim, or Abraham, to sacrifice his son on God’s command, often distributing meat to the poor. But this year people in many Arab countries say higher prices mean they cannot afford the important tradition, reflecting the impact of the Ukraine war which has piled more pressure on already high global food prices . . . In Lebanon, where a three-year-long economic crisis has caused soaring poverty, butcher Makhaber Hassan said sheep prices were rising by the day, now standing at $250 – roughly 7.5 million Lebanese pounds.” 

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Paul Salem and Brian Katulis write, “A key objective for this trip is to send a signal that the United States remains committed to the region at a time of geopolitical uncertainty. President Joe Biden’s trip to the Middle East comes at another critical moment for this troubled, and troubling, region. Tensions between Iran on the one hand and Israel and a number of Arab Gulf countries on the other, stand at a crossroads between the possibility of a U.S. and Iranian return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the risk of a rapid escalation toward armed conflict.”

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Young writes, “As Lebanon’s prime minister designate, Najib Mikati, tries to form a new government, most observers believe that his chances of doing so are very low. Partly that is because it may not be worth it since a presidential election is scheduled later this year and the government will have to resign once again. Therefore, Mr Mikati may simply prefer to keep his current caretaker government in place. But a more profound reason is that the prime minister designate doesn’t want to face the demands of the political parties and satisfy all sides. The reason for this is that Lebanon’s political system has become essentially ungovernable. The notion of sectarian compromise at its heart has become a justification for continuous obstructionism as each side tries to secure its interests. With the collapse of the economy that began in November 2019, followed by the complete immobility of the political class in introducing reforms to ameliorate the social and economic situation, one conclusion is inevitable: the system is utterly incapable of addressing Lebanon’s national challenges. In effect, the country’s social contract is dead.”

Jeffrey writes, “Joe Biden’s first presidential visit to the Middle East is shaping up as a potential game-changer in American actions and attitudes towards the region.  Just a few months ago, the cover of Foreign Affairs proclaimed, “The Middle East Moves On: In Search of a Post-American Order.” Well, a fair interpretation of the run-up to the July visit is that much of the Middle East would actually prefer to stick with Washington. And the administration, at first hesitant about engagement there beyond returning to the JCPOA nuclear agreement with Iran, clearly is listening. The president’s ambitious program between Israel, the West Bank and Saudi Arabia will culminate in a meeting between him and leaders of nine Arab states, four of which (UAE, Bahrain, Jordan, Egypt) already have relations with Israel. He will also meet with Iraq, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, and hold an innovative virtual summit with US, Israeli, Indian and UAE leaders, which underscores the administration’s ‘by-with-and-through’ security relationships with key regional players, while ensuring that Israel is included in them.”

Matthews writes, “Lebanon must prepare to drill for gas regardless of whether or not it strikes a maritime demarcation deal with Israel, as its window to exploit Mediterranean energy is rapidly closing, Lebanese MP Neemat Frem told Middle East Eye. ‘I’m worried that the most likely outcome is that talks with Israel will stall,” Frem said in an interview with MEE in Washington . . . We [Lebanon] need to prepare very quickly for ‘plan B’, which means drilling in non-contested areas as soon as possible,’ he added. Lebanon and Israel have been engaged in US-brokered talks to resolve a festering maritime dispute over the potentially gas-rich territory since 2020. Negotiations have been complicated by the fact that the two countries lack diplomatic relations and are technically in a state of war.”

Abou Zaki, Dagher, and Salam write, “Almost three years into the economic crisis, Lebanon shows no sign of recovery. The sharp decline in economic activity, coupled with the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic and rising inflation, has pushed thousands of Lebanese households into poverty and unemployment. In addition to the rising poverty, the heavily indebted country that has long been struggling with structural macroeconomic anomalies and persistent political instability is now haunted by the sinister memories of the ‘great famine.’ Concerns about food and nutrition insecurity are intensifying at both the national and sub-national levels as the main food security indicators started to follow an alarming trajectory. Thus, there is a pressing need for government to prioritize food security and take immediate actions to prevent hunger and malnutrition. Examining the changing trends in the four main food security pillars, this brief provides several actionable policy recommendations that are urgently needed to strengthen food security in the short and medium-term, at both the national and household levels, recognizing the need for a more comprehensive food security plan that addresses food and nutrition security in its totality.”

Houssari writes, “US mediator Amos Hochstein sent a proposal to Lebanon in March on the demarcation starting from Line 23, which was drawn in a zigzag form. Lebanon handed him an oral response, which he did not reveal, pending the Israeli response. Lebanon has been unable to confirm that Line 29 — which includes the Karish gas field — is the maritime border of Lebanon due to the failure of President Michel Aoun to sign a draft amendment to Decree 6433. It was issued in 2011 and specified that Line 23 was the point for negotiations with Israel to demarcate the maritime borders. However, Aoun considers Line 29 to be the point for negotiations. Line 29 gives Lebanon an additional area estimated at 1,430 square km while, according to the decree deposited with the UN, Lebanon only gets 860 square km of the disputed area . . .Former MP Fares Souaid said: ‘Hezbollah’s drones over Karish are aimed at reminding all parties that Iran is present in the ongoing negotiations between Lebanon and Israel over border demarcation under American auspices and at the expense of the Lebanese interest . . . The incident confirmed by Hezbollah may take place once again, and more serious incidents may occur. Therefore, we call on the nation’s representatives to raise the issue of Iran’s occupation within Parliament’.”

Nasser writes, “Reports from international media indicate that Lebanon may be ready to consider compromising with Israel over resolution of the disputed areas to achieve a final deal over their shared maritime gas resources. The information was leaked to Reuters by three Lebanese officials with knowledge on the matter. American Senior Energy Advisor, Amos Hochstein is mediating on behalf of the United States since, technically, Israel and Lebanon are still at war and have not participated in direct negotiations that would bring about an acceptable settlement.”

Hijazi writes, “Since the end of the Syrian tutelage over Lebanon and the withdrawal of the Syria regime’s troops on April 26, 2005, the formation of a government and its entry into service (after the vote of confidence in Parliament) takes an average of 111 days, according to calculations by L’Orient-Le Jour. The Tripolitan billionaire could therefore have difficulty forming a cabinet, especially in the face of some political actors’ intransigence. The stakes are high: the presidential election, scheduled to begin at the end of August, two months before Aoun’s term in office expires, may not take place. In the event of a presidential vacuum, the president’s prerogatives would constitutionally fall to the cabinet. This situation once again highlights one of the main causes of the Lebanese crisis: the impossibility of governance due to a practice that has continued to drift since the Taif Agreement and that requires an accord between all parties. This is a look back at all the times the logic of compromise or vacuum had the upper hand.”